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United States v. Renzi: Reigning in the Speech or 
Debate Clause to Fight Corruption in Congress Post-
Rayburn 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In United States v. Renzi,1 the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit was asked to decide whether a nondisclosure 
privilege exists under the Speech or Debate Clause (“Clause”) for 
members of Congress.2 The Ninth Circuit boldly refused to 
recognize such a privilege and found that evidence of a 
congressman’s “negotiations,” which gave rise to allegations of 
extortion, mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy, was not protected 
from disclosure or prosecution.3 The D.C. Circuit had previously 
concluded that the Clause gave members of Congress a 
nondisclosure privilege.4 The Ninth Circuit nonetheless created a 
circuit split by holding that such a privilege cuts against Supreme 
Court precedent and “make[s] Members of Congress super-citizens, 
immune from criminal responsibility.”5 In so holding, the Ninth 
Circuit correctly reigned in the Clause and refused to recognize a 
nondisclosure privilege by properly relying upon the Clause’s plain 
language, the framers’ intent to balance power among the branches 
of government while preserving Congress’s integrity, and Supreme 
Court precedent. 
 This Note argues that the Ninth Circuit’s delineation of the 
Clause in Renzi is correct, and that such an interpretation strikes the 
proper balance in fighting corruption in Congress while maintaining 
Congress’s integrity and independence. Part II provides a brief 
review of the Clause’s legal background. Part III summarizes the 
relevant facts and procedural history of Renzi. Part IV presents a 
brief discussion of the D.C. Circuit decision from which the Ninth 
 
 1. 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 2. Id. at 1020. 
 3. Id. 
 4. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 655–56 (D.C. Cir. 
2007). 
 5. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1023 (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 
(1972)). 
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Circuit split and provides an in-depth discussion of the Ninth 
Circuit’s reasoning in Renzi. Finally, Part V analyzes the delineation 
of the Clause in United States v. Rayburn and Renzi and the likely 
impact of those cases. This Part also explains why Renzi more 
adequately comports with Supreme Court precedent and the plain 
language of the Clause. 
II. SIGNIFICANT LEGAL BACKGROUND 
After briefly explaining the Speech or Debate Clause, this Part 
surveys relevant Supreme Court precedent regarding challenges to 
the Clause’s application. It then concludes by examining Rayburn, 
the D.C. Circuit decision from which Renzi split. 
A. The Speech or Debate Clause 
The Speech or Debate Clause provides as follows: 
The Senators and Representatives . . . shall in all Cases, except 
Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest 
during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, 
and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or 
Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other 
Place.6 
The Supreme Court has explained that the purpose of this Clause 
is to balance powers within the Federal Government and “assure a 
co-equal branch of the government wide freedom of speech, debate, 
and deliberation without intimidation or threats from the Executive 
Branch,” “thus protect[ing] Members [of Congress] against 
prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative 
process.”7 
Accordingly, the Court has sought to apply the Clause in a way 
that balances the three branches of government equally while 
insuring the independence of the legislature.8 The Court has 
interpreted the words “Speech or Debate” to go beyond “words 
spoken in debate,” but to include “things generally done in a session 
of the House by one of its members in relation to the business 
 
 6. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1 (emphasis added). 
 7. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 (1972). 
 8. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 508. 
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before it.”9 Such protected actions are generally known as 
“[l]egislative acts.”10 The Court further defined these protected acts: 
[T]hey [are] an integral part of the deliberative and communicative 
processes by which Members participate in committee and House 
proceedings with respect to the consideration and passage or 
rejection of proposed legislation or with respect to other matters 
which the Constitution places within the jurisdiction of either 
House. . . . [T]he courts have extended the privilege to matters 
beyond pure speech or debate in either House, but “only when 
necessary to prevent indirect impairment of such deliberations.”11 
Legislative acts protected by the Clause enjoy the “benefit of 
three distinct protections.”12 The first protection includes immunity 
from prosecution for such acts,13 notwithstanding the motivation 
behind them.14 The second provides immunity for both members of 
Congress and their aides from the requirement to testify regarding 
those acts.15 The third protects against introduction of evidence 
regarding those acts to any jury.16 Consequently, due to the great 
protections afforded “legislative acts,” members of Congress under 
investigation aggressively seek safety under the Clause. 
 
 9. Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880). 
 10. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 625. 
 11. Id. (quoting United States v. Doe, 455 F.2d 753, 760 (1st Cir. 1972), vacated, 
Gravel, 408 U.S. at 606). 
 12. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1020 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 13. See Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616. 
 14. United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180 (1966) (“However reprehensible such 
conduct may be, we believe the Speech or Debate Clause extends at least so far as to prevent it 
from being made the basis of a criminal charge against a member of Congress of conspiracy to 
defraud the United States by impeding the due discharge of government functions. The 
essence of such a charge in this context is that the Congressman’s conduct was improperly 
motivated, and as will appear that is precisely what the Speech or Debate Clause generally forecloses 
from executive and judicial inquiry.” (emphasis added)). 
 15. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 622 (stating that the Speech or Debate Clause does not 
“immunize Senator or aide from testifying at trials or grand jury proceedings involving third-
party crimes where the questions do not require testimony about or impugn a legislative act”). 
 16. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1020 (citing United States v. Helstoski, 442 U.S. 477, 489 
(1979)). 
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B. United States v. Rayburn: An Inappropriate Application of the 
Speech or Debate Clause 
The D.C. Circuit established a nondisclosure privilege under the 
Clause in United States v. Rayburn, concluding that the FBI’s search 
of a congressman’s files in his congressional office was improper.17 
In Rayburn, Congressman William J. Jefferson was accused of 
“bribery of a public official, wire fraud, bribery of a foreign official, 
and conspiracy to commit these crimes.”18 After a finding of 
probable cause, the district court issued a search warrant for 
Jefferson’s office, the Rayburn House, signed on May 18, 2006.19 
For eighteen hours, from May 20th to the 21st, FBI agents reviewed 
all paper documents in Jefferson’s office and copied all hard drives 
and electronic data.20 The FBI agents seized numerous documents 
responsive to the warrant.21 The documents and electronic data were 
then handed over to another team of FBI agents who reviewed the 
documents again to ensure that only responsive, nonlegislative act 
materials were handed over to the prosecution.22 
When Congressman Jefferson challenged the constitutionality of 
the search on May 24, 2006, the district court held that the search 
did not violate the Speech or Debate Clause.23 Jefferson 
subsequently appealed, claiming that prior to the search of his office, 
he was entitled to the exercise of his nondisclosure privilege under 
the Clause before the contents of his office were subject to review.24 
The circuit court began its analysis by outlining the limits of the 
Clause established in United States v. Brewster.25 It then stated that 
the Supreme Court had not addressed whether the Clause includes a 
“nondisclosure” privilege, as Jefferson contended, but that the D.C. 
 
 17. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 656 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
 18. Id. 
 19. Id. at 657. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. 
 22. Id. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at 659 (quoting United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 513 (1972) (limiting 
the scope of the Speech or Debate Clause to “conduct that is an integral part of ‘the due 
functioning of the legislative process.’”)). 
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Circuit had established such a privilege in Brown & Williamson 
Tobacco Corp. v. Williams.26 The D.C. Circuit then proceeded to 
expand the scope of the Brown & Williamson decision, which 
established a nondisclosure privilege that protected against 
compelled production of records in response to a civil subpoena. 
The court extended the same nondisclosure privilege to 
Congressman Jefferson even though disclosure of his records was 
effectuated by a criminal search warrant.27 
The court reasoned that such an expansion was appropriate by 
focusing on the Clause’s purpose to prevent intrusions and 
disruptions in the legislative process and the possibility that allowing 
such searches would “chill the exchange of views [among 
congressmen] with respect to legislative activity.”28 Despite these 
potential dangers, however, the Ninth Circuit later held in Renzi 
that the potential for members of Congress to abuse such a privilege 
outweighed any countervailing interests. 
III. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
Former Arizona Congressman Richard G. Renzi became a 
member of the United States House of Representatives in November 
2002 and held a seat on the House Natural Resources Committee 
(“NRC”), which is responsible for approving land exchange 
legislation before it reaches the House floor.29 Western Land Group, 
a consulting firm hired by Resolution Mining LLC (“RCC”), 
approached Renzi in 2005 with a request to draft and sponsor 
favorable land exchange legislation that would permit RCC to 
acquire the surface rights to a large copper deposit near Superior, 
Arizona.30 
Congressmen Renzi met with officers from RCC in his 
congressional office in February 2005 and told them that they would 
need to purchase property from James Sandlin before he would give 
them his support.31 Renzi did not disclose that Sandlin owed Renzi 
 
 26. Id. at 660 (citing Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 
415 (D.C. Cir. 1995)). 
 27. Id. at 660–63. 
 28. Id. at 660–62. 
 29. Id. at 1016. 
 30. Id. at 1017. 
 31. Id. 
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over $700,000 or that the two men were former business partners.32 
When negotiations with Sandlin were unsuccessful, RCC contacted 
Renzi by phone.33 During that call, Renzi assured RCC that Sandlin 
would cooperate in the future.34 However, RCC and Sandlin never 
reached an agreement.35 When RCC told Renzi about the failed 
negotiations, Renzi responded, “no Sandlin property, no bill.”36 
Less than a week later, Renzi began meeting with another group, 
“Aries,” a company that desired the same surface rights.37 Renzi 
again insisted on the purchase of the Sandlin property before he 
would support any land exchange legislation favoring Aries and again 
failed to disclose his relationship with Sandlin.38 Renzi then assured 
Aries that in the event it purchased the Sandlin property, he would 
make sure the desired “legislation received a ‘free pass’ through the 
NRC.”39 Within a week, Aries and Sandlin struck a deal.40 Sandlin 
subsequently wrote a $200,000 check to Renzi Vino, Inc., a 
company owned by Renzi.41 Renzi later told Aries that he would 
introduce its land exchange proposal once the purchase of the 
Sandlin property was complete.42 However, even after the sale closed 
and Sandlin had paid $533,000 to another company owned by 
Renzi, Renzi failed to introduce any land exchange bill.43 
Following an investigation, two grand juries returned 
indictments against Renzi.44 The second indictment charged Renzi 
with “48 criminal counts related to his land exchange ‘negotiations,’ 
including public corruption charges of extortion, mail fraud, wire 
fraud, money laundering, and conspiracy.”45 
 
 
 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. (emphasis added). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 1017–18. 
 43. Id. at 1018. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. 
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In reviewing the indictments, the district court issued three 
orders.46 The first denied Renzi’s motion for a Kastigar-like 
hearing47 and determined that the Clause protects use of legislative 
act evidence, not disclosure of such evidence.48 The second order 
denied Renzi’s motion to dismiss on the grounds that his 
communication with RCC was not protected under the Clause and 
that there was other evidence sufficient to support the government’s 
claims.49 In its third order, the district court refused to suppress 
evidence “related to Renzi’s ‘negotiations’ with RCC and Aries.”50 
Renzi consequently filed an interlocutory appeal, which was later 
taken up by the Ninth Circuit. 
IV. THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION 
The Ninth Circuit in Renzi refused to recognize a nondisclosure 
privilege under the Speech or Debate Clause.51 The court concluded 
that preventing distraction of legislators is only one purpose of the 
Clause and that claiming distraction alone is insufficient to receive 
complete protection under the Clause.52 It then analyzed other 
Supreme Court precedent and noted that the Court had reviewed 
legislative act evidence in numerous cases without ever mentioning 
whether the disclosure of that evidence had violated the Clause.53  
The Ninth Circuit rejected Renzi’s claim that his “negotiations” 
were protected “legislative acts” and that disclosure of those 
negotiations to the FBI was a violation of the Clause.54 Thus, the 
Ninth Circuit split with the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Rayburn by 
 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. A Kastigar-like hearing requires the prosecution to prove that its case is based 
solely on admitted evidence and does not rely on protected information, like legislative acts 
protected by the Speech or Debate Clause. Kastigar v. Unites States, 406 U.S. 441, 453 
(1972). 
 48. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1018 (9th Cir. 2011). “Use” is something 
beyond mere discovery by FBI agents conducting a valid search; it involves relying on 
discovered information to support the case against the accused. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 470–
71 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
 49. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1018. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1032. 
 52. Id. at 1034. 
 53. Id. at 1039 (citing United States v. Helstoski, 422 U.S. 477, 480–81 (1979); 
United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 173, 177 (1966)). 
 54. Id. at 1032. But see United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 
655–56, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
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rejecting Rayburn’s holding that the Clause precluded both civil and 
criminal discovery of any legislative act material, even during a 
proper search for nonprivileged material.55 The Ninth Circuit 
reasoned that while one purpose of the Clause is to prevent the 
distraction of legislators from their legislative responsibilities, such 
distraction alone could not serve as the “‘touchstone’ for the 
absolute protection of the Clause.”56 The Clause’s purpose goes 
further than merely preventing legislators from distraction; the 
Clause is also meant to protect against bribery and corruption.57 
Thus, the Clause was not meant to provide members of Congress an 
escape from reasonable investigations. To so deprive the Executive of 
its “power to investigate and prosecute and the Judiciary of the 
power to punish bribery of Members of congress” would be 
inconsistent with the Clause’s purpose because “financial abuses by 
way of bribes, perhaps even more than Executive power, would 
gravely undermine legislative integrity and defeat the right of the 
public to honest representation.”58 
The Ninth Circuit further supported its position by citing 
numerous Supreme Court cases that addressed the limits of the 
Clause’s protections.59 The Renzi court reasoned that because the 
Clause only precludes the executive and judicial branches from using 
“legislative act” evidence,60 and since the Supreme Court had 
reviewed legislative act evidence in numerous cases, “with nary an 
eyebrow raised as to the disclosure,” there was ample evidence that a 
nondisclosure privilege does not exist under the Clause.61 
 
 55. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1033 (citing Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 660). 
 56. Id. at 1034. 
 57. Id.  
 58. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 524–25 (1972). 
 59. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1038–39 (citing United States v. Helstoski, 422 U.S. 477, 487, 
490 (1979); Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 627, 629 (1972); United States v. 
Johnson 383 U.S. 169, 185–86 (1966)). 
 60. Id. at 1038 (quoting Johnson, 383 U.S. at 181–82 (“It was not only fear of the 
executive that caused concern in Parliament but of the judiciary as well, for the judges were often 
lackeys of the Stuart monarchs, levying punishment more ‘to the wishes of the crown than to the 
gravity of the offence.’ There is little doubt that the instigation of criminal charges against 
critical or disfavored legislators by the executive in a judicial forum was the chief fear 
prompting the long struggle for parliamentary privilege in England and, in the context of the 
American system of separation of powers, is the predominate thrust of the Speech or Debate 
Clause.”) (emphasis added)). 
 61. Id. at 1039 (citing Helstoski, 422 U.S. at 480–81; Johnson, 383 U.S. at 173, 177). 
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V. ANALYSIS 
In holding that the Clause’s privilege is one of “use, not non-
disclosure,”62 the Ninth Circuit properly split with the D.C. Circuit’s 
decision in Rayburn. A “use” privilege prevents the Executive from 
using evidence they have recovered in a proper search that is a 
protected “legislative act.” Conversely, a “non-disclosure” privilege 
prevents the Executive from even searching material that may 
constitute “legislative act” evidence without consent of the member 
of Congress under investigation. The Rayburn decision that 
recognizes a “non-disclosure” privilege under the Clause for 
members of Congress inappropriately hinders the Executive’s ability 
to investigate members of Congress and threatens the Legislature’s 
integrity. The Ninth Circuit’s decision appropriately reined in the 
protections afforded members of Congress under the Clause and 
properly delineated its limits in accordance with Supreme Court 
precedent and the plain language of the Clause. 
A. The Problems with Rayburn and Its Impact 
The Supreme Court has clearly established that the Clause’s 
purpose is to balance the powers within the federal government.63 
However, Rayburn upended the balance of power in favor of 
Congress when it recognized a nondisclosure privilege under the 
Clause.64 The Rayburn court’s nondisclosure privilege precludes 
executive branch investigation of any material referencing 
“‘legislative acts’ even as part of an investigation into unprotected 
activity” because such investigations distract members of Congress.65 
This effectively eviscerated the Executive’s ability to investigate 
members of Congress because it prevented the “Executive [from 
reviewing] privileged materials without the Member’s consent.”66 
 
 62. Id. at 1018 n.8(citing Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460–61 (1972)) 
(stating that “[i]n Kastigar, the Court held that, when prosecuting an individual who has been 
granted immunity in exchange for his or her testimony, the Government bears an affirmative 
burden of demonstrating that it has not used that testimony, or any evidence derivative of that 
testimony, to further the prosecution”). 
 63. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616. 
 64. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1032 (citing United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 
F.3d 654, 654–56, 666 (D.C. Cir. 2007)). 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 1033 (citing Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 661, 664, 671–72 (Henderson, J., 
concurring)). 
GREEN.FIN (DO NOT DELETE) 3/20/2012 11:43 AM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2012 
502 
Rayburn thus departed from Supreme Court precedent that clearly 
established that the Clause “does not purport to confer a general 
exemption upon Members of Congress from liability or process in 
criminal cases.”67 Consequently, Rayburn’s expansion of the Clause 
jeopardizes the balance of power among the government’s branches 
and threatens the integrity of Congress.68 
Rayburn’s nondisclosure privilege renders judicial warrants 
powerless,69 deprives the Executive of the power to investigate and 
prosecute,70 and deprives the Judiciary of its constitutional duty to 
punish criminal misconduct of members of Congress.71 
First, the Executive is deprived of its investigative and 
prosecutorial power under Rayburn because it makes judicial search 
warrants practically ineffective by requiring a congressman’s consent 
to execute the search. Any member trying to evade prosecution for 
criminal activity would logically never consent if such a search would 
reveal incriminating evidence. Thus, if disclosure to, or discovery by, 
the executive branch alone violates the Clause, members effectively 
enjoy a general exemption from “process in Criminal cases,” which is 
explicitly barred by Gravel.72 While protecting Congress from 
improper intimidation by the executive branch is fundamental to the 
balance of powers in our government, a nondisclosure privilege goes 
too far because it effectively exempts members of Congress from 
searches and seizures and strips the Executive of its power by 
effectively barring searches of a legislator’s property. 
Second, the Judiciary is also deprived of its power under 
Rayburn because the practical inability of the Executive to enforce 
search warrants means that members accused of corruption may 
never stand before a judge. This inhibits the Judiciary from 
exercising its duty to define the scope of the Executive’s power to 
investigate.73 It further deprives the Judiciary of its ability to fulfill its 
 
 67. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 626. 
 68. Williamson v. United States, 207 U.S. 425, 439 (1908). 
 69. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 661, 664, 671–72 (Henderson, J., concurring). 
 70. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 (1972). 
 71. Id.; United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974). 
 72. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 626 (The Clause “does not purport to confer a general 
exemption upon Members of Congress from liability or process in criminal cases. Quite the 
contrary is true.”). 
 73. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 703–04 (1974) (using cases involving the Speech or Debate 
Clause to establish the judiciary’s power to delineate the scope of executive privilege). 
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“primary constitutional duty . . . to do justice in criminal 
prosecutions”74 and to punish bribery of members of Congress.75 
Thus, the nondisclosure privilege recognized in Rayburn disrupts 
the balance of power among government branches and makes 
members of Congress akin to “super-citizens.”76 
B. Renzi’s Proper Delineation of the Clause and its Impact 
The Renzi court refused to recognize a nondisclosure privilege 
under the Clause, appropriately concluding that to do so “would 
require [the court] to agree that there exists some grandiose, yet 
apparently shy, privilege of non-disclosure that the Supreme Court 
has not thought fit to recognize.”77 Renzi followed Supreme Court 
precedent that had never interpreted the Clause’s plain language to 
contain a nondisclosure privilege78 and properly limited the Clause’s 
protections. Renzi further stated that that the Clause’s privilege 
applies only to “use, not non-disclosure,” and anchored the 
distraction analysis,79 i.e., an analysis of how much a search will 
distract a particular member of Congress under investigation, to 
precluded actions only.80 In other words, under Renzi, the Executive 
is allowed to perform properly authorized searches that result in 
discovery of “legislative act” material protected by the Clause as long 
as the Executive does not use that material.81 For example, if the FBI 
conducts a proper search of a member of Congress’s property and 
that search results in the discovery of material that is a “legislative 
act,” the Executive cannot introduce that material as evidence in a 
lawsuit against the member of Congress under investigation.82 And a 
claim that a properly authorized search is improper under the Clause 
because it inappropriately distracts the member of Congress is proper 
 
 74. Id. at 707. 
 75. Brewster, 408 U.S. at 525. 
 76. Id. at 516. 
 77. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1032 (9th Cir. 2011). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 1034–35 (referencing Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 
(1975) (stating that the Clause serves to protect members from private civil actions that 
“create[] a distraction and force[] Members to divert their time, energy, and attention from 
their legislative tasks to defend . . . litigation”)). 
 80. Id. at 1018, 1035 (quoting United States v. Renzi, 686 F. Supp. 2d 991, 996 (D. 
Ariz. 2010), aff’d, 651 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. 2011)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. See id. 
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only when the search is not already precluded.83 In other words, if 
the search is only to recover documents that refer to what occurred 
in a subcommittee hearing, the member of Congress need not prove 
that the investigation is an improper distraction because the entire 
search will already be precluded, as it is purely a search of privileged 
“legislative acts.”84 
1. Renzi comports with the Clause’s plain language and Supreme 
Court precedent  
As stated earlier, the Supreme Court has clearly established that 
the Clause’s purpose is to balance the powers within the federal 
government.85 The Court has stated that the Clause was meant to 
assure legislative independence without making members immune 
from criminal process.86 This precedent comports with the Clause’s 
plain language that prevents the “question[ing]” of members 
concerning their legislative acts.87 
The Clause’s plain language only prevents the executive branch 
from “question[ing]” legislators,88 which logically does not include 
executing search warrants. This is because “question[ing]” usually 
implies that a dialogue occurs between the party asking the questions 
and the party being questioned. Such a dialogue requires the party 
being questioned to take affirmative action in the form of a 
response.89 This is fundamentally different than the proper execution 
of a search warrant because no dialogue occurs and no affirmative 
action or response is required of the individual whose property is 
searched.90 Consequently, a proper search of property under the  
 
 
 
 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. at 1035–36 (citing Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 629 n.18 (1972)). 
 85. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 616. 
 86. Id. at 626. 
 87. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6, cl. 1. 
 88. Id. 
 89. United States v. Rayburn House Office Bldg., 497 F.3d 654, 667–71 (2007) 
(Henderson, J., concurring). 
 90. See id. 
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authority of a search warrant,91 even if such a search reveals 
privileged materials, is not precluded by the Clause.92  
Thus, allowing proper searches of members’ property seems to 
comport with the plain language of the Clause, even if it results in 
the disclosure of some privileged material. The Ninth Circuit’s 
delineation of the Clause that allows for such searches, but prevents 
the use of privileged material recovered in those searches, strikes an 
appropriate balance by acknowledging the need for legislative 
independence without making members of Congress super-citizens, 
immune from criminal process.93 
2. Renzi affirmed that the Clause’s privilege applies to “use, not non-
disclosure” 
Renzi limited the Clause’s privilege only to use,94 which preserves 
the ability of the Executive and Judiciary to act as a check on corrupt 
members through investigation, prosecution, and punishment. The 
Ninth Circuit recognized that the criminal investigation of members 
would most often require discovery of privileged materials (because 
privileged and nonprivileged materials are likely intermingled),95 but 
realized that such discovery, although it could threaten legislative 
independence, is often necessary to discover important nonprivileged 
evidence and is thus permissible. 
The Ninth Circuit further established that when improperly 
redacted, privileged materials are introduced as evidence in trial, a 
 
 91. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 713 (1974) (“Without access to specific facts 
a criminal prosecution may be totally frustrated. The President’s broad interest in 
confidentiality of communications will not be vitiated by disclosure of a limited number of 
conversations preliminarily shown to have some bearing on the pending criminal cases. . . . The 
generalized assertion of privilege must yield to the demonstrated, specific need for evidence in a 
pending criminal trial.” (emphasis added)). 
 92. Rayburn, 497 F.3d at 667–71 (Henderson, J., concurring). 
 93. United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 516 (1972). 
 94. The court in Renzi did not define “use.” However, the court’s analysis makes it 
clear that “use” is something beyond disclosure. United States v. Renzi, 651 F.3d 1012, 1018 
(9th Cir. 2011). Consequently, it is reasonable to apply a standard definition of “use.” Thus, 
when the Executive searches a Congressmen’s property and finds privileged material, that 
material has been disclosed, but it is not “used” until the Executive takes some action with that 
material to accomplish a purpose. DICTIONARY.COM, 
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/use (last visited Mar. 9, 2012). 
 95. John D. Pingel, Note, Do Congressmen Still Pay Parking Tickets? The D.C. Circuit’s 
Overextension of Legislative Privilege in United States v. Rayburn House Office Building, 42 
U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1621, 1640–41 (2009). 
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trial court’s decision should be struck down only if the other 
nonprivileged evidence admitted was not sufficient to support the 
court’s holding.96 This decision puts members subject to suit in the 
Ninth Circuit on notice that the Clause does not act as a shield for 
corruption.97 However, Renzi did aim to protect members 
compelled to act as third-party witnesses from distraction and thus 
keep the Executive and Judiciary in check by “foreclos[ing] 
improvident harassment and fishing expeditions.”98 
3. Renzi refused to recognize a nondisclosure privilege, but provided a 
distraction analysis as a means to protect members of Congress serving 
as third-party witnesses 
Renzi properly denied the existence of any nondisclosure 
privilege under the Clause. However, it also provided that in proper 
searches that are likely to result in the discovery of both privileged 
and nonprivileged material under the Clause, the level of distraction 
imposed on members of Congress serving as third-party witnesses by 
an investigation should be analyzed to protect them when the 
distraction becomes unreasonable.99 
In third-party crimes a distraction analysis is needed because the 
Supreme Court made clear in Gravel that a third-party witness who 
is also a member of Congress may be subject to interrogation 
regarding other members’ legislative acts in grand jury investigations 
and criminal trials.100 In such cases, questioning a member-witness 
can sometimes threaten legislative independence.101 Accordingly, 
 
 96. Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1027–32. 
 97. Id. at 1029 (quoting United States v. Swindall, 971 F.2d 1531, 1548 (11th Cir. 
1992))  (“We think Swindall represents an elegant solution to an awkward problem—how to 
provide a remedy sufficiently measured that it protects a Member’s privilege without 
transforming the shield of the Clause into a sword that unscrupulous Members might wield to 
avoid prosecution for even unprotected acts. We therefore adopt that standard [that ‘[i]f 
reference to a legislative act is irrelevant to the decision to indict, the improper reference has 
not subjected the member to criminal liability [and] [t]he case can proceed to trial with the 
improper references expunged’] and look behind the face of the indictment to evaluate 
whether Clause materials caused the grand jury to indict.”). 
 98. Id. at 1036 (quoting Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 620 n.18 (1972)). 
 99. Id. at 1035 (“[C]oncern for distraction alone precludes inquiry only when the 
underlying action is itself precluded . . . .”). 
 100. Gravel, 408 U.S. at 629 n.18. 
 101. Cf. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 703–04 (1974) (citing cases involving 
the Speech or Debate Clause that establish the judiciary’s power to delineate the scope of 
executive privilege). 
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Renzi found a case-by-case distraction analysis appropriate.102 
However, Renzi limited the power of the distraction analysis by 
stating that distraction alone should never serve as the “touchstone 
for the absolute protection of the Clause.”103 The court stated that 
the potential for distraction should be considered in cases where 
members or their aides are interrogated as third-party witnesses 
concerning the legislative acts of other members of Congress.104 
Protecting members from such interrogations undoubtedly gives 
peace of mind to members who are participating in legitimate deal-
making and compromising that goes on in Congress. Without that 
peace of mind, it is inevitable that less legislation would get passed 
because members would fear that those outside the legislature would 
misinterpret such legitimate deals and members would lose the 
support of their constituents. Thus, Renzi’s delineation of the Clause 
promotes the legislature’s independence without preventing other 
branches from investigating and deterring corruption in Congress. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Renzi appropriately reined in the 
potentially broad protections of the Speech or Debate Clause. Both 
the Clause and Supreme Court precedent are silent about 
prohibiting disclosures of legislative acts in a proper search and 
merely prohibit “questioning” members of Congress about those 
acts. Thus, Renzi’s decision to allow proper searches and subsequent 
disclosures of legislative-act material to the Executive, but prohibit 
the use of recovered privileged material, comports with the Clause’s 
plain language. The allowance for disclosure and prohibition on use 
of legislative-act material complies with the Clause’s purpose of 
protecting Congress’s independence without unduly inhibiting the 
Executive and Judiciary in investigating and prosecuting members of 
Congress. Renzi’s suggested use of a distraction analysis to protect 
members of Congress from serving as third-party witnesses also 
preserves Congress’s integrity; it assures that members will not be 
forced to act as third-party witnesses against other members if it 
would result in an unreasonable distraction from their legislative 
duties. Thus, the Ninth Circuit’s decision properly reined in the 
 
 102. See Renzi, 651 F.3d at 1036–37. 
 103. Id. at 1036. 
 104. Id. 
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Speech or Debate Clause to protect legislative independence without 
making Congress a shelter for corruption. 
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